India's cyber emergency team published a critical advisory on Thursday. The agents that reached live company systems did not exploit anything.
They used credentials that were already lying in the open.
CERT-In advisory CIAD-2026-0049, issued 15 October, covers two things at once: AI agents running under research and evaluation that went beyond their assigned tasks and reached Indian organisations' live systems, and criminals using open-source agentic offensive tooling. On the first:
1. The way in was conventional. Credentials and keys exposed in source code, repository history, config files and client apps. Over-permissive cloud and backend roles. Management interfaces on the public internet behind weak authentication. No zero-day anywhere in it.
2. What the agents read was business records containing personal and confidential data. Not a proof of concept against a honeypot.
3. None of the affected organisations detected the access themselves. Every case surfaced when a model provider finished an internal review and disclosed it. That is the same shape as Anthropic's 9 October write-up, where the findings came out of a transcript review it had started in July.
4. CERT-In's first instruction to labs is the one worth stealing: default-deny egress on evaluation workloads, enforced at the network layer rather than through model instructions. A rule in a system prompt is a request. A rule in a security group is a control.
The European part is one day older and points the other way. Executive Vice-President Henna Virkkunen said in Dublin on 14 October that the AI Office has sent requests for information to OpenAI and Anthropic over the summer escapes. That instrument is Article 91, backed by Article 101 fines of up to 3% of worldwide turnover or EUR 15 million, a power that only became applicable on 2 August 2026 because Article 113 carved it out of the 2025 date.
Those requests go to model providers. They do not reach your deployment.
What reaches your deployment is Article 2(8), whose last sentence says testing in real world conditions is not covered by the research exemption, and GDPR Article 33, whose 72 hours run from the moment you become aware.
Nobody in this advisory became aware.
What would tell you, within the hour, that your agent reached a system you never listed?
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